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Fiscal subsidy is an important part of government expenditure. In many countries
especially in countries of economic transition, fiscal subsidy is one of important
policy tools for maintaining economic stability, optimizing the allocation of
resources and implementing industrial policy. In recent years, Chinese listed firms
have received increasing fiscal subsidies. According to statistics, in 2015, nearly
97% of Chinese listed firms (more than 2700 firms) have received fiscal
subsidies, which are amounted to more than 145 billion Yuan. In fact, fiscal
subsidies have become an important topic worthy of further exploration.
In this paper, we use 1254 Chinese listed companies as a sample to process to
obtain copies of 8778 observations, from the period of 2009 to 2015. We use
theoretical analysis, descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis
method. From the angle of micro enterprise, this paper empirically tests how the
government allocates the fiscal resources between policy-supporting and non-
policy-supporting industry, what factors influence the strategy of allocation and
how about the subsidy efficiency. The study found: (1) compare to the general
companies, companies belonging to the strategic emerging industries can get
more fiscal subsidies. (2) for strategic emerging industries, the listed companies
which has a higher growth rate or higher investment in R&D will receive more
fiscal subsidies form the government. Farther, private enterprises with higher
growth rate and investment in R&D will get more fiscal subsidies. In contrast, the
quantity of fiscal subsidies state-owned enterprises received is independent to its
growth. (3) Fiscal subsidies offered to strategic emerging enterprises will increase
firm’s asset profit ratio and Tobin's Q in the next year, on the contrary, the relative
number of employees and the total amount of tax have no obvious change. This
means that the fiscal subsidies for strategic emerging industries has a positive













Farther, it is found that the more subsidies the state-owned strategic emerging
enterprises received, the higher economic performance the companies will
achieve, but the fiscal subsidies are not helpful for the private strategic emerging
enterprises. Furthermore, the paper divides the sample into two sub-groups,
which are low market degree group and high market degree group. The study
found that, only in the high-market-degree group, the financial subsidy will
promote the state-owned strategic emerging enterprise’s economic efficiency. It
may be that the listed companies in the low market area or high market area put
lots of time and money to rent-seeking, which offsets the positive impact of the
fiscal subsidies on firm’s performance.
The significance of this paper is to study the fiscal subsidies allocation and
subsidy efficiency of listing Corporation from the perspective of industrial policy.
Which make this paper difference from and complement the existing researches.
At the same time, the results of this paper have certain practical significance on
how to improve the fiscal subsidy system and strengthen the external supervision
on listing Corporation. The deficiency of this paper didn’t analyze the root cause
and mechanism of how the nature of the enterprise influence the subsidy
efficiency.
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